Dragonfly holds ZEC as Orchard bug debate raises new questions

Zcash (ZEC) has faced fresh scrutiny after a patched Orchard Pool vulnerability sparked a dispute over whether the privacy coin’s users and investors still face hidden risks.

Dragonfly partner Haseeb Qureshi said the market may be treating the bug as a larger immediate threat than the available evidence supports. He also said Dragonfly continues to hold ZEC, even as developers, investors, and privacy advocates debate what the flaw could have allowed before it was fixed.

Qureshi says ZEC fears look overstated

According to Qureshi, the critical issue was not whether the vulnerability was serious, but where its impact would likely have stayed. He said the bug could have allowed someone to create counterfeit ZEC inside the Orchard shielded pool, but he argued that those coins would face a major obstacle once an attacker tried to sell them.

In Qureshi’s view, an attacker would eventually need to move counterfeit shielded ZEC into transparent ZEC before using major exchanges. Since transparent ZEC can be checked against the public supply, he said any attempt to move inflated amounts into visible circulation would be easier for the network to catch.

For that reason, Qureshi said regular exchange users and many traders likely had limited direct exposure. He placed the largest risk on users who kept funds inside the shielded pool while the vulnerability existed.

Qureshi also cited recent Zcash network data to support his argument. He said the shielded pool’s share of supply fell from 31% to 30% over 48 hours after the disclosure.

To Qureshi, that small drop did not show a rush by privacy-focused users to leave the pool. He described the move as modest rather than a sign of panic, while still acknowledging that the bug created a serious debate around Zcash’s private transaction system.

Wei Dai warns attack could be harder to trace

Meanwhile, Zcash creator Wei Dai argued that a successful attacker may not have needed to empty the Orchard Pool. Dai said a careful attacker could have kept fake ZEC inside the shielded environment and moved it slowly through private transfers.

Under that scenario, Dai said the pool itself could have helped hide the movement of counterfeit coins. He also raised another possible risk. If someone discovered the flaw early, Dai said that person could have opened a large short position against ZEC before the bug became public.

Because ZEC trades on liquid perpetual futures markets, Dai argued that a trader could have profited from the later price reaction without leaving clear on-chain evidence of the original exploit.